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Economies, Evaluations and Explanations 
 
 
Richard J. Aldrich 
 
 
The importance of the related subjects of intelligence and defence to the maintenance of the 
broader Anglo-American relationship during second half of the twentieth century has been 
frequently remarked upon, and indeed often celebrated.1 Christopher Andrew has observed 
that: 'Ever since the Second World War, the Anglo-American intelligence alliance has 
remained the most special and most secret part of the special relationship'. David Reynolds, 
commenting on relations between the UK and the US since 1945, has argued that it is 'at the 
heart of what makes the Anglo-American tie so different from other alliances'. In his study 
of Anglo-American relations since 1963 John Dumbrell devotes a substantial section to UK-
US intelligence and observes that together with nuclear information, the 'intimate 
intermeshing of US and British intelligence  … formed the essence and beating heart of the 
Cold War "special relationship" '. 2
 
Inevitably, we know less about the Anglo-American intelligence relationship during the 
period after Vietnam.3 Despite recent changes in declassification regimes and existence of 
the Freedom of Information Act on both sides of the Atlantic, most files remain closed for 
thirty years. Moreover, intelligence liaison is a sensitive subject and not one likely to attract 
early release. The benchmarks of declassification have, if anything tightened during the last 
few years in response to the events of 9/11. The National Archives in Washington has seen a 
remarkable process in which some 55,000 rather elderly documents, notable only for their 
extreme dullness, have been reclassified in the name of national security.4 In the UK, a 
Freedom of Information Act has resulted in an uneven situation, with some department of 
state attempting to be helpful, while others are seemingly flouting the requirements of the 
legislation.5 In the UK, alongside these general problems, there have been other archival 
issues more specifically related to defence and intelligence.6  
 Notwithstanding these impediments, intelligence during the second half of the Cold War is a 
subject of real interest because of the changing nature of the Anglo-American special 
relationship. Always a partnership of unequals, these allies became more unequal as the UK 
continued its 'long retreat' from its world role, beset by a seemingly endless process of 
economic decline. In the late 1960s Harold Wilson's government was forced to embark on 
the famous withdrawal from east of Suez.7 In February 1968, in the wake of this 
withdrawal, and having just failed in his bid to enter the EEC, a demoralised Harold Wilson 
visited Lyndon Johnson in Washington. The State Department drew up a brief in preparation 
for the Wilson visit, entitled 'What now for Britain?' asking what was left of the alliance. 
The report was surprisingly positive, arguing that the twin fields intelligence and nuclear 
weapons were 'concrete proof' that these two countries remained each other's 'favoured 
partner'. They exchanged information that they shared with no one else and there was a 
division of labour, which meant that on some subjects 'each nation is dependent for its 
intelligence mainly on the other.'8
 
However, 1968 was not the end-point for British decline. Ahead lay Edward Heath's 
troubled premiership (1970-74) and the dark days of the three-day week. Each rocky 
landmark along the road of retreat was accompanied by predictions that the UK might soon 
be a European power only, or that the UK's entry into Europe would soon see 'specialness' 
subsumed within wider transatlantic arrangements. By the time Harold Wilson returned to 
office in 1974, the UK was in the middle of a severe economic crisis, triggering a major 
defence review led by Defence Secretary Roy Mason, which rolled on until 1976. The 
advent of James Callaghan in 1976 brought a visit from the IMF and there seemed no end to 
climate of perpetual economic gloom and retrenchment. The events of the mid-1970s 
prompted policy-makers to undertake a searching review of defence priorities and to 
confront difficult choices. As a result, officials were forced to cast up general evaluations 
and explanations of the fundamentals of their policy in a way that they were perhaps not 
accustomed to do. Accordingly, the documents generated by these processes are rarely 
uninteresting.  
 
Specifically, recently declassified material generated by the mid-1970s Defence Review 
casts interesting light on relations between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 
and Ministry of Defence (MOD), on the Defence Intelligence Staff and ultimately on the 
place of intelligence in Anglo-American relations. In July 1975, as part of the ongoing 
process of Defence Review, Sir Michael Cary, the Permanent Under Secretary at the MoD, 
wrote to his opposite number in the FCO, requesting comments and suggestions regarding 
the overall management of the MOD. This was only natural given that many FCO 
departments had increasing engagement with their defence counterparts on matters such as 
arms control or NATO planning. Accordingly, a general call went out to all FCO 
departments for their opinions.9
 
Diplomatic commentary on the MOD poured forth and James Cable, Head of the FCO's 
Planning Staff, set the tone. He identified several related issues. First, he considered that the 
MOD had not achieved genuine inter-service integration and maintained up to six separate 
hierarchies.10  Second, he was conscious that in areas such as European defence 
procurement and arms control, the diplomats and the military were not making joined-up 
policy. Third, he felt that too much effort was still being devoted to 'intelligence and analysis 
concerning areas of the world where the British Armed Forces are never likely to play a 
significant part.' Indeed, during a recent joint long-term planning exercise which aimed to 
forecast the international situation in 1985 the MOD had been reluctant to accept the 
prediction of the diplomats that by then the UK 'would have little interest in anything 
outside Europe'. He added that while the diplomats often joked that the MOD would rather 
concern itself with foreign policy than with military matters, nevertheless this observation 
did 'conceal grain of truth'.11  
 
The most sustained criticisms were directed at the scope and scale of activities undertaken 
by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS), especially the extent to which it was still gathering 
intelligence that was predicated on a continued world role. The MOD certainly maintained a 
large intelligence gathering and analytical apparatus - and also boasted a Directorate of 
Economic Intelligence. Alistair Hunter in the Western European Department offered the 
example of Cambodia to illustrate the way in which MOD was directing intelligence effort 
to areas of the world which 'were now unimportant to us'. He continued:  
 
I remember, in April 1970, being required by the DIS to devote (along with 
others) an infinite number of man hours trying to modify their theory that, after 
the fall of Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge would take over Cambodia in a matter of 
days. The FCO view was that the Khmer Rouge were unlikely ever to be a 
serious threat. The correct assessment would have been mid-way between the 
MOD and FCO views: but it mattered very little, either way, to British foreign 
or defence policy. Nevertheless, so far as I am aware, the section of DIS in 
question, even these days, is staffed at the same level.12  
 
Officials in other departments added comments in a similar vein. Some noted that the MOD 
were busy 'collecting more intelligence about China than we can possibly need'. Others 
thought that the MOD produced more detailed and voluminous economic intelligence than 
was necessary and wondered why this economic analysis work was not located 'elsewhere in 
Whitehall'.13  
 
David Wright, also from the Western European Department, complained about the 
proliferation of defence officials that seem to be duplicating the functions of others and 
again focused on what he called the MOD's 'excessive allocation of manpower to 
intelligence and analytical work'. Underlying this sentiment was a concern that the MOD's 
considerable appetite for intelligence often drew it into areas that were political rather than 
military, and prompted defence officials to engage with subjects on which he thought them 
ill-equipped to comment. As an example, Wright singled out the matter of Current 
Intelligence Group Meetings [CIG meetings], which constituted the largely geographically 
focused sub-groups of the Joint Intelligence Committee: 
 
Most CIG meetings which I attend either take place because the MOD alone 
among the Whitehall departments considers it necessary to have a paper 
circulated on the subject or, when other Whitehall Department think it 
necessary, the MOD are represented by serried ranks of advisers in comparison 
with the presence of one FCO Desk Officer. I have faced particular problems 
over MOD requesting the production of papers when there is nothing useful to 
say. Furthermore, when asked to produce their own draft, it is jejune to the point 
of embarrassment. This places the FCO in a difficult position. We are obliged to 
spend time and energy improving and correcting a draft which we never thought 
necessary in the first place.14
 
Wright's colleague, Sophie Lambert, the desk officer for Berlin, expressed similar 
sentiments, arguing that MOD's political and intelligence analysis work 'appears to me to be 
both wasteful and erratic'.15  
 
FCO-MOD tensions over intelligence existed at the regional level as well as in Whitehall. In 
the UK Embassy in Bonn, Reginald Hibbert chaired the local Joint Intelligence Committee 
(Germany) and struggled to keep a watch on a vast empire of military intelligence activities 
that included the exciting escapades of the BRIXMIS mission in East Germany. Hibbert 
would sometimes commission JIC Germany reports in order draw out the attitudes of his 
military colleagues on these awkward matters. The military and the diplomats rarely saw 
eye to eye on the levels of risk that attended these operations.16 David Beattie offered, en 
passant, a fascinating comment on the Middle East, suggesting that here again, a key 
function of the regional JIC was to serve as a local interlocutor between the diplomats and 
the military. His own recent experience in Cyprus suggested that the main purpose of having 
a local joint intelligence group was not so much to generate fresh intelligence but instead 'to 
give the military firm political direction'. He continued: 
 
Since they have their own communications, they [the military] cannot otherwise 
be prevented from firing off their own political judgements to the MOD which 
are sometimes wildly in error. In Nicosia, I used to draft once a week an 
Intelligence Summary which was usually little more than a resume of Chancery 
reporting over the past week. This was telegraphed out to the bases, and the 
Counsellor of the High Commission would then set out once a week to the bases 
in order to preside over the meeting of JIG (Cyprus). One or two commas might 
be removed from my draft by the military and then replaced after furious 
argument and the thing would, as a rule, be despatched to London as drafted in 
the High Commission. It was all, no doubt, a great waste to the Counsellors' 
time, and of helicopter fuel: but if one considered the time that might have been 
wasted in Whitehall by clashes of opinion between the MOD and FCO, the 
effort was probably worth it.17  
 
Of course, some of these comments reflected the undoubted pleasures of a bit of inter-
departmental back-biting, but others reflected longer-term tensions over intelligence 
between the MOD and FCO that could be traced back as far as the Second World War. It is 
likely that they also reflected several structural oddities within the UK intelligence system of 
which even the FCO officials themselves were perhaps not fully aware.  
 
First, the Defence Intelligence Staff had been created some ten years earlier, in 1964, nursed 
along by the inter-service evangelist, General Kenneth Strong. Strong, who enjoyed great 
standing by virtue of his excellent relations with Washington had headed the only genuinely 
inter-service intelligence organisation in Whitehall after 1945, the Joint Intelligence Bureau 
(JIB). However, it had been possible to create his bureau only because it consisted of 
curious bits and pieces, including topographical intelligence, that no-one else much wanted. 
His subsequent struggle to merge service intelligence departments to create the Defence 
Intelligence Staff (DIS) took twenty years and the inter-service compromises that led to its 
creation in 1964 involved some considerable duplication. This was reflected in other parts of 
the MOD.18  
 
Second, although the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) was a much-vaunted aspect of the 
UK intelligence system, it had been systematically starved of support. The JIC, which 
resided in the Cabinet Office together with its subordinate elements and assessments staff, 
remained remarkably small. Therefore, in terms of professional analytical capability, DIS 
was the Whitehall giant. This reflected its approach as well as its size, since the DIS boasted 
dedicated long-term analysts, while those serving the JIC were usually temporaries serving 
out a two-year assignment. The JIC had failed to follow its American opposite numbers in 
creating a category of professional analysts within the Whitehall system. The extent to 
which the UK central intelligence machine was 'assessment-lite' was an odd quirk which and 
number of people have commented on down the years, including the Franks enquiry on the 
Falklands in 1983.19 In 2004, Lord Butler felt the need to revisit the same territory in his 
enquiry into intelligence on Iraqi WMD and made the same observations.20  
 
However, the most substantial explanatory factor here - and one that was largely hidden - 
was Anglo-American intelligence relations. The sustained critique of DIS that poured forth 
from various quarters in the FCO prompted a lengthy rejoinder from Derek Tonkin in the 
FCO's Permanent Under Secretary's Department (PUSD). Tonkin sought both to reassure 
his colleagues, and to explain the mysteries of the seemingly bloated DIS machinery with its 
appetite for global intelligence gathering.21 On the intelligence side, PUSD was the FCO's 
central nexus.22 It had been created in the late 1940s, bringing together a number of 
planning and controlling functions within the Foreign Office. Hitherto, the Private Secretary 
to the Permanent Under Secretary had carried many of these functions more or less single-
handed. The best example of this was perhaps the ill-fated wartime incumbent, Peter 
Loxley, who had undertaken much intelligence co-ordination on behalf of his master, 
Alexander Cadogan. PUSD had also absorbed the Services Liaison Department which had 
served as a wartime interface between the diplomats and the JIC. It co-ordinated with SIS 
and ran a small group that oversaw special operations.  After 1945, with the advent of 
regular imagery and sigint gathering missions by aircraft and submarines, PUSD also 
became the clearing-house to which MOD turned for political approval for each specific 
operation. Depending on their sensitivity, these requests were reviewed at the official, 
ministerial or even prime ministerial level.23
 
In July 1975, PUSD were clearly anxious to prevent any of the adverse comment on the 
sprawling intelligence activities of DIS from finding its way into the FCO's formal feedback 
and reaching the ears of the MOD. Tonkin was therefore at some pains to re-assure his 
diplomatic colleagues, informing them that the ongoing defence review would have a 
significant impact on MOD intelligence gathering, resulting in what he anticipated would be 
at least a 10% cutback. However, at the same time he encouraged his colleagues not to 
address this matter openly in the context of the review of the management of MOD, 
suggesting that instead it this would probably be dealt with through 'other channels'. In the 
event its appears that none of the above negative FCO commentary on DIS reached the ears 
of the MOD. 
 
More importantly, Tonkin offered a lengthy apologia for MOD's interest in intelligence and 
analysis concerning areas of the world where the services were never likely to be deployed. 
This defence was couched almost entirely in terms of the high value of the Anglo-American 
intelligence relationship. He argued that the efforts of DIS helped to offset an intelligence 
imbalance in terms of what the UK offered and what it received from the US.24 He also 
explained that while the necessity of UK defence cutbacks had been reluctantly accepted by 
Washington, the Americans had nevertheless urged that the UK intelligence effort should 
not be trimmed, as they regarded this contribution as pre-eminent. Finally and perhaps most 
intriguingly, Tonkin offered the observation that the UK-US intelligence relationship was  
about rather more than intelligence. It had now come to constitute some of the wider 
substance of the mainstream political relationship and offered London a remarkable window 
on political thinking in Washington. It is rare for officials to cast up these sorts of 
generalised evaluations of liaison and the presence of Tonkin in PUSD suggests that it was 
probably authoritative. Accordingly, his minute may be of general interest to readers of this 
journal and, rather than attempting to offer a lengthy summary of the document, it it perhaps 
best to reproduce it here in appendix.25  
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECRET 
 
 
         C. Mr Pellew 
 
 
Mr Jackson (Defence Dept) 
 
Cc: Mr Sykes 
       Mr Cable 
       Mr Thompson c.r. 
 
 
 
 
 
MANAGEMENT REVIEW OF MOD HQ 
 
1. Your minute [fo.8] of 26 August. 
 
2. PUSD have one general comment to make, relating to paragraph 2 of 
Mr Cable's minute [fo.6] of 31 July; and one specific comment relating 
to PUSD's experience in liaison with the MOD during the past two years. 
 
3. Our general comment is that I am sure that Mr Cable is absolutely 
right when he says that too much effort is still being devoted to 
intelligence and analysis concerning areas of the world where the 
British Armed Forces are never likely to play a significant part. 
Scarcely a week passes without PUSD being conscious of some alleged 
intelligence requirement prompted by the Defence Intelligence Staff 
which seems to be either unnecessary or ill-advised. Nonetheless, 
considerable progress has been made in recent years, particularly 
during the last 18 months, in persuading the DIS to be more reasonable. 
The Defence Review itself should have a significant impact on MOD 
intelligence-gathering. Our own administration have had some success, 
through the Cabinet Office, in reducing the establishment of MOD posts 
abroad devoted to intelligence - notably in Washington. The DIS itself 
has been subject to fairly rigorous inspection; and as a result of the 
current economy review of Government expenditure, which will have its 
impact on the intelligence agencies, at least another 10% of the DIS 
budget will be cut. In short, I think you can take it that there is 
bound to be some significant trimming of the DIS Vote which will be 
reflected in a reduction in MOD intelligence-gathering and analysis. I 
would not myself think that this aspect should be considered in the 
context of the present Management Review of MOD HQ and I feel sure the 
MOD would resist this on the grounds that it is being dealt with on 
other channels. 
 
4. I would like however to offer some apology for the MOD's interest 
in intelligence and analysis concerning areas of the world where 
British Armed Forces are never likely to play a significant part. As is 
generally known in the FCO (but not by the press or Parliament), there 
is a long-standing intelligence relationship with the United States 
dating from the Second World War. The balance of advantage in this 
intelligence exchange is overwhelmingly in our favour. If the Americans 
were to withdraw their contribution, we would lose much extremely 
useful intelligence, including certain very important lines of 
intelligence which only the Americans can supply. Nonetheless, the 
Americans need us, both for the intrinsic value of our contribution - 
especially our assessments - but also because (we know) they find it 
extremely useful, particularly in times of crisis, to have a sounding 
board against which they can judge their own assessments. Their 
relationship with us in the intelligence field is a quite unique; it is 
of a kind which they enjoy with no other partner. 
 
5.   The intelligence exchange with the Americans is perhaps the 
last bastion of the "special relationship". But it is still very active 
and very effective. This is accepted by those of influence in the 
American Administration and I believe the relationship pays us very 
useful dividends in the political sphere. The relationship gives us an 
entrée to American political thinking in a way that no other country is 
able benefit. Visitors to Washington over the past 18 months have all 
come back with a message something on the following lines:  
 
"We know that you in Britain spend much more on intelligence 
than is strictly justified by British defence interests. 
However, we in the United States find your contribution to  
intelligence of very great value and we very much hope that, 
whatever economies you may feel bound to make, you will not 
let your intelligence contribution diminish. We would regard 
this as a serious loss." 
 
6. What this all means is that I think it would be wrong for the FCO 
to insist that the effort devoted by the MOD to intelligence and 
analysis should only concern areas of the world where the British Armed 
Forces are likely to play a significant part. There are very real 
British interests, more of a political than an intelligence nature, 
which make it most desirable that our contribution to the Anglo-
American intelligence exchange should not diminish significantly. While 
certain economies in the MOD in this sphere may be desirable, it is 
most important that we should not forget the political benefits of the 
Anglo-American intelligence exchange. I suspect that this aspect is 
insufficiently understood within the FCO generally - and certainly by 
the press and by parliament, for obvious reasons. If anything, it is 
partly the fault of PUSD for not having drawn the message sufficiently 
to the attention of Heads of Departments and Under-Secretaries. 
 
7. Now for the specific comment. PUSD's dealings with the MOD have 
generally been smooth and harmonious, though we would welcome a greater 
flexibility and greater willingness on the part of our contacts to take 
responsibility. In times of crisis - for example, during the Turkish 
invasion of Cyprus last year - we found that the civilian component of 
the MOD continued to work only normal office hours, leaving the crisis 
management arrangements to Service personnel. As a result, on at least 
one occasion, PUSD, who should have been consulted about certain MOD 
intelligence-gathering operations agreed at short notice after normal 
hours, found at they had been short-circuited because the Service 
operational staff in the MOD did not understand PUSD's function and 
sought clearance for certain very sensitive RAF operations with the 
[FCO] Emergency Unit. Although PUSD advice was available throughout (a 
PUSD officer attached to the Emergency Unit on the night shift), 
decision were taken at the desk officer level which could have had 
potentially serious consequences. We think it most important that the 
MOD civilian-staff policy department should operate, as PUSD do, on a 
24 hours basis during times of crisis or tension. 
 
 
        DTonkin  
 
 
D Tonkin 
29 August 1975      PUSD  
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